Conceptualistic Pragmatism by Pinkard, Terry
 European Journal of Pragmatism and
American Philosophy 
X-2 | 2018
Pragmatism and Idealism
Conceptualistic Pragmatism
Terry Pinkard
Electronic version
URL: http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/1338
DOI: 10.4000/ejpap.1338
ISSN: 2036-4091
Publisher
Associazione Pragma
 
Electronic reference
Terry Pinkard, « Conceptualistic Pragmatism », European Journal of Pragmatism and American
Philosophy [Online], X-2 | 2018, Online since 11 January 2019, connection on 30 April 2019. URL :
http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/1338  ; DOI : 10.4000/ejpap.1338 
This text was automatically generated on 30 April 2019.
Author retains copyright and grants the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy right
of ﬁrst publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Conceptualistic Pragmatism
Terry Pinkard
 
I
1 American  pragmatism,  like  German  idealism,  was  created  by  a  generation  who  had
collectively suspecting that they were going to have to live unprecedented lives.  The
paths through life that their parents and grandparents had traced seemed to offer no
effective guide, and they thereby felt that they had to imagine different ways of thinking
about life, the world, and even about thinking itself. For the pragmatists, the background
was  the  American  Civil  War,  the  second  scientific  revolution  (in  chemistry  and,  in
Darwin’s biology), and industrialization and its accompanying brutalities and dislocation.1
For the idealists, it was the contradictions deeply twisted into the fragmented social and
political world of Germany prior to and immediately following the French Revolution. In
both cases, there was the generational experience that they could not be the people who
fit into that world, and that things therefore were going to and had to change.
2 Of course,  there were also great differences.  Most notably,  the early idealists did not
experience industrialization in Germany, even if they did experience some of the shocks
its early appearance in England had produced. Likewise, it was not the violence of a civil
war  but  the  violence  and  promise  of  the  French  Revolution  that  spurred  their
imaginations. As we might put it, for both of them – idealists and early pragmatists – the
problem was that of grasping their own times in thought and in a thought that was also
not simply relative to or merely expressive of the times but also the way thought “now”
had to understand its prospects and possible limits.
3 For both idealists and pragmatists, the key word was “experience” – and in both cases in
the German sense of Erfahrung. This was not the experience of a sense-datum or a fleeting
moment or a raw feel. It was rather the experience from which one learned something, a
more concrete conception of an encounter with a sometimes recalcitrant physical and
social world. It was not accidental that Hegel’s original title for his first real book, The
Phenomenology  of  Spirit,  was  the Science  of  the  Experience  of  Consciousness.  The idealists
joined to that conception of “experience” the rhetoric of “life” and the “organic,” of an
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overall  purposiveness  to  be  found  within  things,  whereas  the  pragmatists  coupled
experience with a rhetoric of “openness” and an interest in the logic of inquiry. In both
cases, there was a shared conception of the key role of subjectivity-as-activity in thinking
about the world, and rejecting, as Dewey later encapsulated it, the “spectator” view of
knowing and acting. (It would be interesting but wildly beyond the scope of this paper to
contrast the British response of the “absolute idealisms” of Green and Bradley, et al. to
the modern British experience.)
4 More  crucially,  in  both  cases,  the  idealists  and  pragmatists  were  responding  to  the
modern worry which reaches its  high tide in Kant’s  philosophy about the limits and
possible limitations of thought. Kant, as is well known, thought that given the pure forms
of our own intuitive faculties, our thinking was necessarily restricted to appearances and
could not progress to knowledge of things in themselves. Things in themselves were real,
but they existed on the opposite side of the boundary between thought and the real.
However,  by the time idealism had moved on to  Fichte,  Schelling and to  Hegel,  the
Kantian idea that our conceptual capacities are bounded by the forms of intuition was
replaced by the idea of conceptual thought as boundless, as answering only to its own
demands.2
5 To the pragmatists (as well as others), this seemed to be something like rationalism gone
mad, a basic failure to learn the basic Kantian lesson about the limitations under which
finite  human  beings  have  to  think.  The  kind  of  openness  to  experience  which  the
pragmatists extolled meant that we had to be open, as it were, to reality changing our
minds for us so that continuous progress in thought can be actualized and the novelty of
new learning could be vouchsafed.  Pragmatism, as a logic of  inquiry (to use Dewey’s
phrase) devised a way of looking to the real by way of theory that made theory (of all
sorts,  scientific as well as philosophical) open to new experiences and to novelties in
social life and, crucially, to improvement.3
 
II
6 To jump ahead: By the end of the twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first,
pragmatism was certainly alive and well, but in one of its most influential shapes, it had
been by and large formed not from the pragmatism of Peirce, Dewey or James but from
the much less studied C. I. Lewis. Lewis described his own version in his book, Mind and
the World Order, as “conceptualistic pragmatism” (1929: xi). It is Lewis’ picture, more or
less, of mind, world, inference and sensibility that has shaped the kind of contemporary
pragmatism  that  finds  its  exemplars  in  the  works  of  W. V. O. Quine,  Wilfrid  Sellars,
Richard Rorty,  and Robert  Brandom. Much of  this  version of  pragmatism consists  in
accepting Lewis’s framework while attacking or shifting the ways in which the frame is
put together. In particular, two attacks which are familiar to contemporary philosophers
are the Sellarsian attack on the myth of the given and the Quinean attack on the absolute
difference between the analytic and synthetic. Much of what remains after those attacks
is Lewis’ framework as redescribed and transformed without those two elements. It is
thus worth turning back to Lewis’ system if for no other reason than to remind ourselves
where the current version comes from.
7 Without stretching terms too much, Lewis’s position could be called Kantian pragmatism.
4 We might sum up Lewis’ view as the following: if there are limits to thought, they are set
by reality, perhaps even by human reality; thinking is an activity, and it is the ends of
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such activities (the purposes) that set the standards by which we evaluate the means;
something like Kant’s categories are to be justified if at all in light of their utility for
serving  those  ends.  In  Lewis’  system,  we  thus  see  pragmatism and  idealism coming
together under the dominance of the pragmatic component.
 
III
8 Lewis’s picture of mind and the world order can be easily summarized, although as with
everything good the devil (or the lord) is in the details. Lewis’s picture is characterized by
stark contrasts, even dualisms (of the kind that Dewey, for example, would disparage). In
Lewis’s  thought,  there  is  the  a  posteriori  versus  the  a  priori,  the  given  versus  the
constructed, the passive versus the active. This occurs within Lewis’s larger picture of our
contact with reality being through the senses, after which we then organize the data that
comes in to us by way of the concepts we apply to the sensuous data.
9 Our  most  basic  concepts  are  prior  to  all  experience.  They  are  what  Kant  calls  the
categories but which Lewis extends further than merely classificatory concepts to include
all attempts at making sense of that which given to us in experience (including naming,
classifying, defining, and inferring).5 Relations among concepts determine their meaning.
The basic concepts – the categories – are a priori: They are true, if they are true, no
matter what, as Lewis puts it, and they cannot be determined by experience itself. They
are the results of acts of legislation, not abstractions from experience (ibid.: 127). Their
meaning is analytic, not material, and to know the meaning of a concept is to know how it
relates to other concepts.6 The use of such a priori concepts is implicit in our familiar
modes of behavior, and getting clear on their meaning just is making explicit what is
always, already there implicitly.7
10 The use of such categories is that of making sense of what is given in experience. “The
given” is the empirical element in experience. It consists (Lewis’s term) in qualia, which
cannot be named, are ineffable and can only be indicated by phrases such as “looks like” (
ibid.:  123).  Such  “givens”  are  subjective  and  can  never  themselves  be  objects  of
knowledge. Knowledge, in this pragmatic-Kantian picture, requires the cooperation of
two distinct faculties – concepts and sensibility – whose functions cannot be conflated or
confused with each other. 
11 Lewis notes that the German idealists and their kin deny any such givenness, holding that
there can be no element of experience which figures into our judgmental activity which
does not have the structure of thought in it. To speak anachronistically, Lewis denies the
given is a myth at all. John McDowell’s version of the attack on the myth of the given, for
example, has to do with our spontaneity (our conceptual capacities) supposedly going
deeply into our receptivity without remainder.8 Lewis’s argument against that would be
relatively straightforward: He agrees with McDowell up to a point: “[T]he objectivity of
the real requires always construction by the mind. This thesis does not imply any denial
that the given is independent of the activity of thought” (Lewis, 1929: 46). On its own, the
given cannot be knowledge at all. Nonetheless, thought, our judgmental capacity, cannot
alter the sensuous quality of experience. If I am seeing red, I am seeing red, and I cannot
alter that by thinking otherwise (even though, as Lewis argues, “red” cannot be the name
of any particular qualia, since qualia cannot have names).9 The “given” is simply that
sensuous element of  knowledge that  we cannot alter by our own activity and which
comes to the mind from the real itself. 
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12 On Lewis’s account, therefore, purely empiricist theories err in thinking that there could
be any knowledge at all via the givens of experience.10 The given is ineffable, and there is
no ineffable knowledge. All knowledge is discursive and thus conceptual in structure.
Rationalist theories (and here he includes the idealists) err in thinking that since our
categorial concepts are a priori and whose meaning cannot be determined by the given
that such categories are therefore autonomous elements of knowing.11 The truth of the
matter  is  pragmatic:  Our  a  priori  categories  are  not  eternally  fixed but  are  open to
change,  and  the  criteria  for  choosing  which  of  them  we  legislate  to  experience  is
pragmatic in that they are judged in terms of how well they fit a goal. 
13 Which goal or goals? Those of life itself taken as an ongoing activity: “Knowledge,” Lewis
concludes, “is pragmatic, utilitarian, and its value, like that of the activity it immediately
subserves, is extrinsic. It has value as an end in itself only so far as, in life, the activity is
the goal, or at least the two cannot be separated” (ibid.: 145). Thus, the a priori categories
that make sense of the otherwise ineffable givens of sensibility are themselves a social
achievement, something legislated collectively and not products of “pure reason” nor are
they matters of objective fact. The categories are guides to action, not descriptions read
off of sensible data.12
14 Why then are  there  not  different  categories  for  different  societies  or  even different
individuals? Lewis’s answer: Our own natural like-mindedness. Such like-mindedness is
part of our natural history, which consists in natural needs and aspirations but also just
as much consists in fashioning categories to better predict the course of events as we put
the picture together with the givens of sensibility.13 We communicate with each other or
have the same concept when we how our behavior implicitly expresses those concepts:
“The concept is a definitive structure of meanings, which is what would verify completely
the coincidence of two minds when they understand each other by the use of language” (
ibid.:  89).14 Unless  there  was  an  identity  of  meaning,  there could  be  no  genuine
coincidence of minds. There is no identity of givens. This kind of like-mindedness leads to
our having a common world that is the common human world, since “we do not expect to
have a common reality with an insect” (ibid.:  113). Our common world is thus itself a
social achievement.
15 Our knowledge of empirical objects can therefore only be a matter of probability.15 The
real object is only “the given as conceptually interpreted,” (ibid.: 117) and, as known, “the
real object […] is a construction.”16 Ultimately, the real object would manifest itself only
at  infinity.  Knowing is  an infinite approximation to the real,  so that  the “totality of
possible experiences in which any interpretation could be verified” (which would be
infinite) “is the entire meaning of that interpretation” (ibid.: 32). Not merely do we not
know the object fully (non-probabilistically) until the end of the endless series, we could
also not know fully what we mean until the end of the endless series. Indeed, it would
only be with a picture of what that would look like that we could assign the probabilities
of these interpretations. 
16 Given Lewis’s view, there can simply be no transcendental deduction of the categories in
Kant’s sense, since what drives the need for such a deduction is the skeptical worry that
our sensibility may present us with objects that do not fall under the categories. Meeting
that worry drove Kant into his various formulations about how it must be that we impose
the categories on experience such that no object could appear that violated any of the
categorial requirements. No such limitation, however, can be put on the given by our
concepts – that much is meant by “the given.” We cannot put any limits on what might
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show up in our sensory experience.  Nor can the given limit what possible categorial
concepts we might construct.17 To underline the point: All the possible givens have no a
priori concatenation that fixes in advance what qualia can appear. Such givens are not
even  constrained  by  logic  itself,  since  the  ultimate  criteria  for  any  logic  would  be
themselves pragmatic, to be evaluated in terms of how well they too fit some purpose.18 If
there are any limits to knowledge, they will have to be the limits to reality itself. The
Kantian mistake, which Lewis attributes to all forms of phenomenalism (under which he
classifies Kantianism) is that “from the relativity of knowledge to the mind, it argues to
the impossibility of knowing the independent real” (ibid.: 173). The real object can indeed
be  interpreted  or  measured  in  a  number  of  different  ways,  but  that  diversity  of
interpretation does not  mean that  the real  object  is  beyond all  possible knowability.
There simply can be no realm of “in principle” unknowable things in themselves, even
though there not only may be many things we do not know and even some that are
beyond us because of natural facts about our makeup.
 
IV
17 Given that summary, where does Lewis’s conceptualistic pragmatism stand in relation to
its earlier forbearers in German idealism and his predecessors in American pragmatism,
and where does it stand in relation to his later successors in pragmatism? With regard to
the latter, we can see how Lewis’s framework sets the shape for a good bit of the later
pragmatism embodied by Quine, Sellars, Rorty and Brandom, much more so than does,
say, James’s or Dewey’s pragmatism. The sharp dualisms that Lewis defends – conceptual
understanding (the analytic nature of meaning) on one side, sensory givens on the other
– provide a powerful picture of mind and world. Lewis’s resulting picture was thus, most
abstractly put: A causal connection (input), plus the sensory givenness of qualia, plus an
inferential processing of the qualia, and then a propositional statement of the inferential
interpretation of the qualia. Lewis’s successors transformed that picture into what we can
think of as embodying a tripartite causal and inferential view of the matter. First, there
are the causal inputs on the minded organism (photons entering the retina, sound waves
in the air vibrating bones in the ear, etc.); second, there are the causal outputs of the
organism  that  respond  to  those  causal  inputs  (among  these  causal  outputs  are
observation sentences or phrases, such as “Lo, a cow” or “This is green”); and in between
are  the  inferential  movements  within  the  mind  itself  (where  “within”  just  means
“internal to the inferential process”). Thus, a stimulus of red (a wavelength of a certain
sort) affects the sensory apparatus, the inferential wheels begin spinning (“Well, if it’s
red, it’s certainly not green”), and there is a causal, learned output, the production of a
sentence. (“Whoa, that’s red, all right.”) 
18 Quine  took  over  this  picture,  but  rejected  the  idea  of  purely  conceptual  meaning
(analyticity) and substituted instead the image of a web of such beliefs in which some
were more central than others but none was “conceptually” or “analytically” true. That
left only the causal inputs and outputs (which, sort of in keeping with some of the science
of his day, he interpreted behavioristically), and inferential connections (which in the
term of art of a large part of contemporary philosophy is called “the normative”) are
reduced to beliefs to which we develop dispositions to assent or dissent.19 Quine took
Lewis’s  already  fairly  naturalized  framework  which  still  had  a  separate  place  for
philosophical reflection on the relation between mind and world and fully naturalized it
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to render it compatible completely with natural science as it was practiced in mid- to-late
twentieth  century  culture.  Quine,  as  it  were,  deconceptualized  Lewis’s  conceptualist
pragmatism but kept its overall structure: Categorial concepts are those that are more at
the  center  of  the  web  of  belief  (so  they  are  not  a  priori  as  the  a  priori  has  been
traditionally  conceived),  they  are  justified  in  terms  of  their  pragmatic  utility  (for
example, in predicting events), and they are subject to change or being given up when
they no longer serve certain purposes as well as others.20 
19 The other line of thought that followed in Lewis’s wake dismissed the “given” under the
pressure of Sellars’s general criticism of all forms of givenness and his more specifically
focused criticisms of  the given as  a  sensory content  that  could serve in any way as
premises  in  cognitive  activity  (carried  out  in  his  canonical  “Empiricism  and  the
Philosophy of Mind”).21 Once the sensory “given” had been rejected, the resulting three
pronged image that itself came from Lewis’s framework became canonical:  There is a
causal interaction between organism and environment (best studied by neuroscientists
and empirically minded psychologists), which elicits a series of normative inferences that
are not themselves based on any further inference but are simply set in motion by the
input, and a learned disposition to utter phrases such as “Whoa, that’s red, all right” and
even more complicated phrases such as “There’s a rabbit.” Learning to respond to inputs
in ways that adequately embody the inferential network of one’s beliefs is itself a causal
process – it has to be, since otherwise without an immediate given, there would be an
infinite regress of inferences – an idea which is best encapsulated in Robert Brandom’s
concept of  reliably differential  responsive dispositions.22 We are trained as youths to
respond to wavelengths of light between 620-750 nm (red light) in ways that in English
come out as something like “Ooh, red.” It is not the case that we see a qualia, grasp its
category in English, and then infer to “Ooh, red” – we simply are trained to respond those
wavelengths in certain ways, and when things go right we acquire the dispositions that
turn us into reliable responders who can perform subtly differentiated responses. 
20 This picture also is at work in Richard Rorty’s views on mind and world,23 and it seems to
be the picture at work in Donald Davidson’s equally influential  views.24 It  reaches its
apotheosis in Brandom’s explication of it. Brandom takes Lewis’s framework, transforms
concepts into inferential  links,  discards the Lewisian sensory given and substitutes a
generalized concept of “the physical process that occurs between organism and world in
the organism’s sensing of the world,” and keeps the naturalized concept of our being
trained (which leans on inherent dispositions in the species) into responding in certain
ways. We pass from sensing beings to sapient beings when we learn to move fully in the
inferential  patterns  which  are  embodied,  as  Lewis  puts  it,  in  a  concept’s  “internal
(essential or definitive) relationships with other concepts” (1929: 83) (which Brandom
takes to be formal and material inferential relationships, where material inferences are
those like, e.g., “if X is red, then it is not green”). Common to all these is an idea that the
test, the rationale, for operating with one interpretive scheme over another is that of
predicting  the  future  and  thus  learning  to  control  it  in  some  way.25 That  is  the
“pragmatic” in “conceptualist pragmatism.”
 
V
21 To  those  familiar  with  German  Idealism,  Lewis’s  system  most  obviously  bears  a
resemblance to Fichte’s post-Kantian philosophy. Like Fichte, Lewis dispenses with the
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very idea of an in principle unknowable thing-in-itself,26 and like Fichte, he thinks that
there is progress in knowledge which ends only at infinity (in other words, which has no
ending).27 For  that  matter,  Lewis  himself  even  states  his  affinity  with  Fichte:  “This
interpretive fiat is what Fichte stresses as the positing of the ‘not-me’” (1929: 46).
22 The  resemblance  starts  from Fichte’s  own commencement  with  the  conception  of  a
thinking agent so that for the agent’s thinking (the “I”) to have any real authority, the
agent must posit – that is, authorize – that there is something entirely distinct from its
thinking (the “Not-I”) which exercises authority over thinking. That is, thinking must
acknowledge its absolute authority to bestow authority on something else to exercise its
authority against thinking, and without that bestowal of authority, the “Not-I” could have
not authority at all. As it were, the perceptual object must be endowed by the thinking
agent  with  the  authority  to  determine  if  the  thinking  agent’s  thought  about  it  is
authoritative. The rest of Fichte’s system is more or less bound up with trying to make
sense of how that seeming contradiction could possibly work itself out into something
less seemingly paradoxical. Lewis himself, however, thinks that the paradox in Fichte’s
beginning is never resolved, and he offers his own diagnosis of why.
23 Fichte  wonders  where  the  mind (or  the  conceptual  framework  itself)  gets  its  initial
authority to do this,  and he claims that the only alternative is  to think of  the mind
positing itself as exercising such authority in the first place and then going on to think of
this  authority  as  requiring  of  itself  that  something  other  than  mind  give  it  both
determinate content and real authority – a kind of “I authorize it to tell me what I can
authorize.” Fichte starts from a conception of unity or oneness of mind with itself and
then goes on to see how mind fractures itself into two in seeking its own unconditional
epistemic  authority.  Lewis,  on  the  other  hand,  argues  that  we  must  begin  with  a
fundamental dualism between concept and sensory given (the “I” and the “Not-I”), and
his argument boils down to the claim that we can in the last analysis make no sense at all
of what it would mean for mind “to create or constitute itself” as Fichte seems to think.28
Lewis’s alternative to Fichte thus goes: Our conception of a mind already includes the
limitation of its conceptual capacities by something not conceptual which is given to us
via our senses. We begin with a dualism, not institute it out of some more original unity.
24 If anything, this puts Lewis squarely into the debate the German idealists had among
themselves. The post-Kantians were all united in their rejection of Kant’s conception of
the a priori forms of intuition (although for varying reasons). An influential traditional
interpretation of that rejection had the post-Kantians committed to the view that, once
we have rejected Kant’s forms of pure intuition, there was no cognitive role for intuitions
to play at all, and as a result they then thought the “mind” (now hypostatized and, as it
were, cosmologized) constructed itself and its content without reliance on intuition at all
(or that intuitions were themselves such constructs). However, that was not the post-
Kantian view really at all, since they were all deeply worried about the place that sensible
intuitions  played  in  cognition.  None of  the  major  figures  thought  (contra  the  often
received view) that the sensible was formless, but they also did not think that it carried a
form with itself that limited conceptual thought in any kind of way that would lead to
some conception of an in principle unknowable realm of things in themselves. 
25 Lewis  also  rejects  the  possibility  that  we  impose  conceptual  form  on  a  formless
sensibility, and he also does not think that our sensory capacities come with any a priori
form on their  own.29 (The a priori  for him is  to strictly restricted to the conceptual
sphere.) On Lewis’s picture, human mindedness is not a matter of rules being applied to
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formless data. Comprehensibility has to include both sides within itself: Concepts (as a
priori categories) and sensibility (as the given of qualia). 
26 In particular, Hegel’s worry about Fichte’s way of proceeding was, put most simply, that
Fichte’s way was seductively and misleadingly concrete. Fichte speaks of the “I” positing
itself as positing its other, its “Not-I,” and that way of speaking conjures up a picture of a
determinate object: An individual person, perhaps looking out a window or staring at a
screen,  thinking about  something,  maybe feeling an ache in  his  or  her  leg,  perhaps
consumed with thinking about some philosophical issue, or maybe fully absorbed in an
activity such as slicing vegetables. That is, not, however, the “I” that Fichte has in mind,
so speaking of an “I” in this case is deceptive. To get a grasp on Fichte’s core idea, though,
we must make things more abstract before we can make them more concrete. This too
was more or less Lewis’s view. 
27 Hegel’s own response, most generally stated, is the idea that the conceptual includes as a
constitutive element of itself the sensible, not because we impose the conceptual on the
sensible or somehow mix them together like oil  and vinegar in a salad dressing,  but
because conceptuality includes the very concept itself  of  responsiveness to its  other,
sensibility. Hegel calls this the concept’s “negativity” for good reason: It forms what in
current philosophical jargon is usually called these days “normativity,” the possibility of
a judgmental (the use of concepts) appraisal as true or false, adequate or inadequate, etc.
Our sensibility cannot be conceived except as a component of our conceptuality, and vice
versa. This led to what Hegel knew in advance would be one of more difficult thoughts,
namely, his beginning his Logic with the concepts of being and nothing as both equivalent
and distinct. “Being,” or the “is-ness” of things is an empty concept; it is not a thing, not a
distinct item that could be thought or intuited and therefore cannot be distinguished
from “nothing”; and therefore as Hegel puts it, “Pure being and pure nothing are therefore
the same […] But the truth is just as much that they are not without distinction; it is rather
that they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct yet equally unseparated and
inseparable” (Hegel & Di Giovanni, 2010: 59-60). Thus, the thought of being and nothing
turns out not to be an adequate thought at all wholly within its own internal standards,
since  it  contradicts  itself,  and,  again  to  resort  to  Hegel’s  own  words,  “it  therefore
contradicts itself in itself, because what it unites within itself is self-opposed; but such a
union destroys itself” (ibid.: 81). This finally gets fleshed out into Hegel’s view that “the
concept”  has  within  its own  self-conception  (the  concept  of  the  concept)  its  own
otherness – concept and sensibility are two distinguishable but inseparable components
of mind.30
28 This  is  part  of  Hegel’s  fundamental  appropriation  of  Kantianism.  Whereas  Fichte,
Schelling and even Hölderlin had begun with the conception of an original unity that
necessarily fractures itself and then seeks to restore that unity – a version of a basically
Judeo-Christian story of the Fall – Hegel begins with the fracture itself. It is not that one
has unity (“being”) and then disunity (“being and nothing”). The fracture is there at the
outset and there is no way of overcoming or abolishing it.  As Hegel explicitly states:
“being has passed over into nothing and nothing into being – ‘has passed over,’ not passes
over” (Hegel  & Di  Giovanni,  2010:  59).  What had presented itself  as a fully thinkable
judgment – “Being, pure being […] In its indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to itself
and also not unequal with respect to another” (ibid.) – turns out not to be an adequately
thinkable judgment at all.  It  turns out to be a deeply flawed thought that cannot be
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further entertained as it was but has to be altered in order to preserve whatever sense it
originally seemed to have.
29 What is perhaps surprising is Lewis’s own rather Romantic response to such an issue:
“That mind is thus continuous with the finally mysterious is-ness of what is – we must of
course grant; in the contemplation of mind we contemplate one aspect of the Great Fact
in the presence of which all  explicit thought is silenced” (Lewis, 1929: 236-7).  Lewis’s
response  sounds  oddly  more  like  Heidegger,  maybe  even  like  Wittgenstein  in  the
Tractatus,31 or perhaps even a bit like Schelling.32 The original unity of mind and world is
not explicable in terms of any of the categories. Indeed, Lewis seems to be committed to
the idea that since such an original unity could not be conceptually comprehended or
sensibly given, that it could not really be “thought” at all and thus must be met with
“silence” even though it a necessary consequence of our thought (Lewis’s “it must be
granted…”). To take it further: Lewis’s response is even a bit Kantian in spirit, resembling
roughly what Kant said about the experience of natural beauty: It is the indeterminate
concept  of  something  that  is  neither  nature  nor  spirit  (that  is,  neither  “given”  nor
“concept”) that is the common ground of both and thus is the basis of freedom.33
30 Whatever else it is, Lewis’s response is not Hegelian. The idea of a thought of the final
ground of  all  things,  the absolute,  as  something beyond any conceptual  grasp,  to be
accompanied by silence, was anathema to Hegel. He famously called (what was clearly
Schelling’s version of it) the night in which all cows are black. He also noted about such
views: “There is nothing to be intuited in it, if one can speak here of intuiting; or, it is only
this pure empty intuiting itself” (Hegel & Di Giovanni, 2010: 59). It is not that he thought
that we knew everything, would ever know everything, or that we have reached some
point like the mythical  end of history.  The absolute which thought grasps in Hegel’s
system is indeed unconditional, but it is the unconditional grasp of itself as completing its
task only at infinity (that is, never at any point in time), and this timeless unconditional,
absolute grasp of itself and its project counts for it counts as “the absolute.” Moreover,
such a conception of  the absolute is  not merely the rather formal conception of  the
absolute as, say, succeeding only in that it succeeds in knowing in an absolute fashion
that it must fail at what it most wants to do – something like that is more akin to Kant’s
conception of reason’s only possible success – but a comprehension of itself that can only
emerge  after  it  has  exhausted  the  available  alternatives  and  seen  both  how  those
alternatives are lacking, how they push on to this conclusion, and how they shape the
way the conclusion has to form itself. (At the end of his life, Hegel noted to himself about
how  in  the  period  surrounding  his  writing  his  Phenomenology that  the  prevailing
conception of the absolute was at that time an abstract conception.34 Presumably,  he
meant  that he  had  now  gone  beyond  that  abstraction.)  In  effect,  conceptuality
comprehends itself only in its development of its own self-consciousness about itself, and
that includes the difficult Hegelian conception of the concept’s otherness within itself,
the  idea  that  the  determinateness  of  a  concept  has  to  do  with  how it  incorporates
something non-conceptual – the world – into itself, how conceptual capacities, as it were,
come with the idea of responding to the claims of sensibility.35
31 This is also because the Hegelians (and the Schellingians too, although in a different way)
think of these capacities as making sense only within the context of the human life-forms
in which they manifest themselves. As earlier noted, the metaphor of the organic rather
than the mechanical played a key role in both Schelling’s and Hegel’s way of presenting
more easily digestible pictures of their views. Roughly put, the mechanical metaphor sees
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sensibility and conceptuality as each existing apart from the other like modules in a
machine  and  as  working  together  harmoniously  when  the  machine  is  functioning
correctly (more or less as the components of a well functioning mechanical watch work).
The organic metaphor sees sensibility and conceptuality as two, as it were, organs serving
the purposes of the organism, such that the determinateness of neither organ could be
specified outside of its role in the life of the organism as a whole. Neither can be given its
rightful determinacy outside of the way it functions in human life. For each animal life-
form, the world shows up in a certain way given the way its neurophysiological system
works in connection to its environment. Lettuce shows up to rabbits as food, rabbits show
up to foxes as food (and foxes show up to coyotes as food, and on and on). The world
shows up to self-conscious humans in a way in which the conceptual always figures in it.
As Hegel notes, the world itself shows up as pointing to infinity (as there being always
“one more” in time, in space, and so on), and such infinity can only show up to self-
conscious creatures since infinity can only be a topic of pure thought, never of purely
sensuous experience. Thus, for Hegel, Fichte’s mistake was in thinking that subject or
object, one or the other, had to have priority in a truly rigorous account of knowledge
and valuation, and Fichte was thus misled into thinking it had to be something concrete:
the thinking, active subject, the “I.” The thinking, active subject, however, appears only
once we have understood the basic way in which thinking is both the unity of an original
fracture between sensibility and concept and requires self-consciousness.
32 In Mind and the World Order, Lewis often speaks as if the two capacities of sensibility and
conceptuality  were  fully  independent  modules,  but  if  that  were  true,  then  their
functioning together would have to come from a purpose external to both of them (as it
does to the parts of the mechanical watch) instead of each being what it is in terms of a
purpose that is internal to the organism itself.
33 Lewis does not discuss in any except a passing manner the way in which the pragmatic
application of the conceptual apparatus is part of the purposiveness of the organism, but
he does discuss how the like-mindedness of human knowers is based on facts about the
kind of creatures they are – or, to use a non-Lewisian formulation, how it is based on their
form of life.36 If  he took that more seriously,  it  would lead him away from his more
mechanically sounding and into a more Hegelian-Schellingian-Deweyian stance which
would be more appropriate to his own system.37 It would also have required him to probe
more deeply into what he acknowledged was mind as a social product and to explore the
first person singular and plural and how the second person address builds from one to
another, as Hegel did in his Phenomenology. The very concept of self-conscious life itself –
what Hegel decided to call Geist – involves the conceptions of a first and second-person
address which then builds itself up into a first-person singular and plural (an I and a We).
38
34 At that point, the paths traced by idealism and conceptualistic pragmatism would have
met.39 To appropriate an image from another philosopher, both the older idealists and the
newer pragmatists would find Hegel waiting at the end of the path for all of them, arms
folded, saying that he had known all along they would be coming that way. Generational
experiences often lead to odd crossroads. 
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NOTES
1. See Louis Menand’s delightful but limited account in The Metaphysical  Club (2001).  Menand
overstates the influence of the Civil War and overly ascribes the pragmatist movement to traits
of  certain  key  personalities,  but  he  does  bring  out  the  generational  aspect  of  the  shift  to
pragmatism.
2. In his 1823 letter to Duboc, a Hamburg hat-maker, Hegel explained that he had nothing against
the doctrines of the Scottish philosophers about realism, namely, that the objects of knowledge
are independent  of  our representations of  them. What he took issue with was the idea that
“things are what they are” – which he rendered in his own terms as “Übereinstimmung des Seins
mit  sich  selbst” (or  “the  correspondence  of  being  with  itself”) –  is  itself  intelligible  without
comprehending  that  this  too  is  a  “thought-determination”  (Denkbestimmung) and  is  thus  the
proper subject of the logic of thought itself. See Hegel & Hoffmeister (1961: Briefe #450, p. 12).
3. The young Schelling had a particular animus to seeing the value of new industrial technology
in the context of modern life. As Schelling supposedly told Henry Crabb Robinson, “It is absurd to
expect the science of beauty in a country that values the Mathematics only as it helps to make
Spinning  Jennies  and  &  Stocking-weaving  machines,”  cited  in  Robinson,  Robinson  &  Morley
(1929: 118).
4. In her treatment of Lewis, Cheryl Misak (2013: 191) also describes, rightly, Lewis’ position as
being  that  of  a  Kantian  pragmatist.  In  taking  Lewis’  “conceptualist  pragmatism” as  a  direct
descendant of Charles Peirce’s version of pragmatism, Misak also incorporates and corrects much
of the still rather meager commentary on Lewis. She also shows the close link between Lewis’
position as it was taken up at the time and the emerging school of logical empiricism in Vienna
(which Lewis  predated).  Because of  the perceived similarities  between Lewis  and the Vienna
school, Lewis’ position was much easier to integrate into the emerging paradigm of linguistically
oriented analytical philosophy than was, for example, Dewey’s.
5. See Lewis (1929: 259). Lewis does not explicitly mention inference on that page, but it follows
from what else he says about inference at other parts of the book, such as when he claims: “The
nature  of  a  concept  as  such  is  its  internal  (essential  or  definitive)  relationships  with  other
concepts”  (ibid.:  83).  He  justifies  his  relative  lack  of  discussion  of  inference  as  constituting
concepts  by noting,  “The most  important  topic  in  this  connection would be the meaning of
implication and the nature of inference. But examination of that question would of necessity be
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too long and complex for inclusion here” (ibid.: 433). To distinguish these a priori concepts from
others, Lewis coins the term “categorial” to demarcate them: “‘Categorial’ is used throughout
with the meaning ‘pertaining to the categories.’  This avoids possible confusion with meaning
specifically ‘unconditional, not hypothetical’” (ibid.: 12, footnote).
6. See (ibid.: 82): “Logical analysis is not dissection but relation; the analysis of A into Band C does
not divide A into constituents Band C but merely traces a pattern of relations connecting A with
Band C. As regards their conceptual meaning, terms are very closely analogous to points in space.
A point is nothing whatever apart from its relation to other points; its very essence is relational.
Likewise  the  conceptual  meaning  of  a  term  is  nothing  whatever  apart  from  other  such
meanings.” This inferential, relational emphasis in Lewis is a point stressed in Baldwin 2007.
7. See among other instances Lewis (ibid.: 87-8): “In such cases the meaning is possessed by the
mind both in the sense of this consistently determined attitude and in the further sense that how
this  meaning  should  become  explicit  and  what  would  be  recognized  as  essential,  when  the
attitude  became  self-conscious,  is  already  implicit  in  the  attitude.”  Lewis  also  claims  that
“identity of meaning consists practically in implicit modes of behavior , and what is involved in
these always runs beyond what can be explicit in consciousness at any one time” (ibid.: 84).
8. As is well known, McDowell carries out his own critique of the myth of the given in terms of
Gareth Evans’s defense of a version of it in Mcdowell (1994).
9. See (ibid.: 61, 124).
10. See the discussion of how Lewis’s conception of the given differs fundamentally from the
empiricist model often attributed to him in Misak 2013.
11. Lewis  (1929: 432):  “This,  as  it  seems  to  me,  but  serves  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  the
conceptual interpretation of experience is, at bottom, something concerning which rationalistic
accounts and empiricistic theories are, in their opposite ways, both false, and the pragmatic is
the true one.”
12. ( Ibid.:  21):  “Our categories are guides to action.” And, p.  93:  “Our common world is  very
largely a social achievement – an achievement in which we triumph over a good deal of diversity
in sense-experience.”
13. See (ibid.: 113): “‘Like-mindedness’ consists primarily of three things; the possession of like
needs  and  of  like  modes  of  behavior  in  satisfying  them,  second,  the  possession  of  common
concepts, represented in behavior by discrimination and relation, and third, the capacity (evoked
particularly when community in the other two respects threatens to fail) of transcending our
individual limitations of discrimination by indirect methods.”
14. Lewis also notes: “Identity of meaning consists practically in implicit modes of behavior” (ibid
.: 84).
15. ( Ibid.:  x):  “The  choice  of  conceptual  systems  for  such  application  is  instrumental  or
pragmatic, and empirical truth is never more than probable.”
16. See (ibid.: 117, 58).
17. See (ibid.:  37): “The pure concept and the content of the given are mutually independent;
neither limits the other.” Likewise,  p. 220: “An absolute and a priori limitation of experience
could not be known.” Lewis seems to backpedal on this in one other passage, where he says, “The
qualia of the given are the clue to the applicability or inapplicability of concepts and set the the
limits of conceptual interpretation” (ibid.: 157). If qualia are the content of the given, and the
content of the given does not limit the pure concepts, then it is difficult to see how qualia “set
the limits of conceptual interpretations.” Perhaps somebody has an idea on how to square the
circle on the this, but I tend to think of it as an indication of a basic and irresolvable tension in
Lewis’s thought.
18. See (ibid.: 247): “Genuine issues may of logic are those which stand above such questions of
the merely self-critical integrity of the logical system. There are such issues, and these cannot be
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determined – nay, cannot even be argued – except on pragmatic grounds of human bent and
intellectual convenience.”
19. This  rather  constricted  conception  of  the  normative  goes  against  the  more  expansive
conception to be found in the “organic pragmatism” of John Dewey’s thought, and against the
more expansive view to be found in German idealism. It also runs up against other types of views
that argue for a non-representationalist,  non-conceptual  meaning of  “norms” to be found in
even simple organic life. For the view that such normativity is conceptually more basic than that
of representations, see Burge 2009. 
20. As Lewis states his own case: “New ranges of experience such as those due to the invention of
the telescope and microscope have actually led to alteration of our categories in historic time […]
Categories and concepts do not literally change; they are simply given up and replaced by new
ones”(1929: 268).
21. Sellars, Rorty & Brandom 1997.
22. Brandom (2000: 118): “The empiricist tradition is right to emphasize that our capacity to have
empirical knowledge begins with and crucially depends on such reliable differential responsive
dispositions. But though the story begins with this sort of classification, it does not end there. For
the  rationalist  tradition  is  right  to  emphasize  that  our  classificatory  responses  count  as
applications of concepts, and hence as so much as candidates for knowledge, only in virtue of
their role in reasoning. The crucial difference between the parrot’s utterance of the noise ‘That is
red’ and the (let us suppose physically indistinguishable) utterance of a human reporter is that
for the latter, but not the former, the utterance has the practical significance of making a claim.
Doing that is taking up a normative stance of a kind that can serve as a premise from which to
draw conclusions. That is, it can serve as a reason for taking up other stances.”
23. See Rorty 1991.
24. See the discussion of Rorty’s and Davidson’s views in Frank B. Farrell 1994.
25. ( Ibid.:  357-8):  “Knowledge  of  reality  serves  for  the  control  of  experience:  without  the
possibility of control, not only would knowledge be worthless, there would be for us no reality to
know.” 
26. (Ibid.: 236): “If we should think of mind as what the rationalists suppose – superimposing on
reality a rigid mask of form outside which mind itself could never catch a glimpse – then this
altogether  universal  and  un-get-overable  form  could  never  become  self-conscious.  It  would
remain – in Fichte’s phrase – the ‘Great Thought which no man has ever thought’.”
27. Fichte  &  Breazeale  (1988: 122):  “Consequently,  the  spheres  of  activity  of  the  particular
sciences  are  infinite.  Thus  an  exhaustive  Wissenschaftslehre presents  no  threat  to  the  human
mind’s infinite progress toward perfection. The Wissenschaftslehre does not negate this infinite
progress; on the contrary, it provides it with a foundation which is totally secure and beyond all
doubt. It assigns to the human mind a task which it cannot complete in all eternity.”
28. (Ibid.: 425).
29. (Ibid.: 236-7): “But the categories are not the form of that which, having no alternative and no
bounds, is formless. They are the explicit bounds of that which, if it transcend them, must fall
into some other category. They are divisions within the comprehensible in general, but not the
shape of comprehensibility itself.”
30. See Robert B. Pippin 2005. See also (forthcoming): Robert Pippin 2018.
31. For an interpretation along that line, see Friedlander 2001, and 2014.
32. “But now it is obvious that if there were not an absolute limit to knowledge – something that,
even without our being aware of it, also absolutely fetters us and binds us in knowledge, and that,
in the course of knowing never once becomes an object, precisely because It is the principle of all
knowledge – then we could simply never arrive at knowledge, even of one solitary thing […]
there is an ultimate of some sort, from which all knowledge begins, and beyond which there is no
knowledge” (Schelling & Heath, 1978: 16). The resemblance to Schelling is made more curious by
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Lewis’s  one  reference  to  Schelling  (in  relation  to  Fichte)  in  which  it  is  hard  to  see  if  he  is
endorsing Schelling (or probably more likely) adopting a fully ironic tone: “Schelling however,
acknowledges the justice of the challenge and seeks to meet it with amazing results. Starting
from the Fichtean premise, A = A, he deduces eventually the electrical and magnetic properties of
matter!” (Lewis, 1929: 190, footnote). 
33. Kant  speaks  of  judgments  of  the  beautiful  as  where  “judgment  finds  itself  referred  to
something that is both in the subject himself and outside him, something that is neither nature
nor  freedom  and  yet  is  linked  with  the  basis  of  freedom,  the  supersensible,  in  which  the
theoretical  and the practical  power are  in  an unknown manner combined and joined into a
unity” (Kant & Pluhar, 1987: §59, p. 229 (354)).
34. See Hegel, Wessels & Clairmont (1988: 552); Hegel & Pinkard (2018: 469).
35. Hegel thus says, “For the sake of freedom, the Idea also has […] the hardest opposition within
itself; its being at rest consists in the security and certainty with which it eternally creates and
eternally overcomes that being at rest and therein brings itself together with itself” (Hegel & Di
Giovanni, 2010: 759).
36. See formulations such as “‘The human mind’ is distinctly a social product, and our categories
will reflect that fact […] The human animal with his needs and interests confronts an experience
in which these must be satisfied, if at all. Both the general character of the experience and the
nature of  the animal will  be reflected in the mode of  behavior which marks this  attempt to
realize his ends. This will be true of the categories of his thinking as in other things” (Lewis, 1929:
238-9).
37. See Pinkard 2007.
38. See Hegel & Pinkard (2018: ¶177), where Hegel begins with a second-person encounter, “A
self-consciousness is for another self-consciousness,” which he then goes to argue culminates in
a first-person singular and plural:  “[…] in the oppositions of the various self-consciousnesses
existing for themselves: The I that is we and the we that is I” (ibid.: 108).
39. Lewis himself resisted that path and in his later work drew closer to the empiricism that was
starting to prevail in American philosophy. Clarence Irving Lewis 1947. A good account and more
or less a limited defense of it can be found in Misak 2013.
ABSTRACTS
C. I. Lewis’s version of pragmatism, which he called “conceptualistic pragmatism,” has been little
studied and is nowadays overlooked, eclipsed by the more famous pragmatisms of Dewey and
James.  However,  it  was  Lewis’s  version  that  came  to  dominate  the  formation  of  post-1945
pragmatism in the United States. It provided the framework in which Quine (his former student),
Sellars,  Davidson,  Rorty  and  Brandom  operated.  Roughly,  that  structure  involved  a  passive,
sensory ineffable given and an ordering and classification of the given by a priori categories.
Comprehending  those  categories  was  a  matter  of  apprehending  a  priori  truths,  but  those
categories  were  also  changeable.  Rational  change  involved  giving  some  up  and  substituting
others to meet certain basic human interests. We thus have the picture of mind and world that
culminates  in  a  certain  sense  in  Brandom’s  philosophy:  External  causal  inputs  linked  to  an
internal normative inferential network which then results in causal outputs of linguistic shape.
This is very different from the classical German idealist conception of mind and world, which
takes the distinguishability-but-inseparability of concept and sensory intuition as its core.
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